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Linking Law and Life: Justice Sotomayor’s
Judicial Voice
LAURA KRUGMAN RAY†
In her five terms on the Supreme Court, Sonia Sotomayor
has become the most visible and recognizable Justice. Much
of her public presence is owed to her recent autobiography,
My Beloved World, which appeared in 2013 and promptly
rose to the top of the New York Times bestseller list.1 In the
process, Sotomayor became a public celebrity, speaking
candidly about her life in media interviews, appearing on
Sesame Street, throwing out the first baseball at a Yankee
Stadium game, and ushering in the New Year at Times
Square.2
Readers of Justice Sotomayor’s Supreme Court opinions
might be surprised to find few traces of that exuberant
personality. Instead, Sotomayor’s voice is generally
restrained, avoiding the emotional tone that characterizes
her autobiography. But her judicial voice is scarcely dry and
academic. It conveys a distinctive judicial persona, that of a
judge who is often puzzled by the responses of her colleagues
but not indignant in the manner of Justice Scalia3 or playfully
† Professor of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1981; Ph.D., Yale University, 1971; A.B., Bryn Mawr College, 1967.
1. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD (2013); See David Fontana, The
People’s Justice?, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 447, 449 (2014).
2. For a substantial list of her public appearances, see Fontana, supra note 1,
at 468-69.
3. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 226-29 (2002).
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conversational in the manner of Justice Kagan.4 Sotomayor’s
judicial persona is generally hard at work trying to
understand the unfortunate positions taken by her
colleagues and pointing out to them in an ironic, though
never harsh, manner their inconsistencies and errors.
In this spirit, she is likely to react with bewilderment
rather than anger when she disagrees with the Justices on
the other side of an issue. Writing in dissent from the
majority’s view that state law issues heard below are barred
from habeas review while new claims might be heard, she
notes that “[t]his suggestion is puzzling.”5 And finding the
majority’s statement of Fourth Amendment law inaccurate,
she again observes mildly “[t]hat is puzzling.”6 She has a
number of synonyms to convey the same response. What the
other side has offered may be “perplexing,”7 “nothing short of
baffling,”8 “curious,”9 “paradoxical,”10 something that she
simply “cannot fathom,”11 or, more broadly, “a mystery the
majority opinion leaves unsolved.”12 She refrains, however,
from combative or harshly critical language, and the focus
remains on the conundrum presented by the other side’s
outcome.
In her most extended use of this imagery, Sotomayor in
dissent compares the process of evaluating the majority’s
4. Laura Krugman Ray, Doctrinal Conversation: Justice Kagan’s Supreme
Court Opinions, 89 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1-2 (2013).
5. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1418 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
6. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1258 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
7. Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2059 n.4 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
8. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1664 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
9. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1666 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
10. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1120 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
11. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1673. For another use of the same phrase, see
Pliva v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2592 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
12. Sossamon, 131 S. Ct. at 1666 n.3.
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argument in a case awarding custody under the Indian Child
Welfare Act to the process of solving a mystery.13 Although
“[a] casual reader of the Court’s opinion could be forgiven for
thinking this an easy case,”14 the skilled reader knows better.
Thus, “[t]he reader’s first clue that the majority’s supposedly
straightforward reasoning is flawed is that not all Members
who adopt its interpretation believe it is compelled by the
text of the statute.”15 Next, “[t]he second clue is that the
majority begins its analysis by plucking out of context a
single phrase.”16 And “[t]he third clue is that the majority
openly professes its aversion to Congress’ explicitly stated
purpose.”17 Like an experienced reader of detective novels,
the perceptive reader of Court opinions should respond to the
majority’s baffling result by analysis of the clues provided
rather than by attack.
Readers of Sotomayor’s autobiography may be reminded
of her recollection that, in her early life, the girl detective
“Nancy Drew had a powerful hold on [her] imagination.”18
Considering the careers open to her as a diabetic, she ponders
how she could be a detective without joining the police force,
an occupation barred by her illness.19 And Nancy Drew, the
heroine of a series of mystery novels for girls, seemed to
provide a tempting solution: the eighteen-year-old “sleuth
tools around in her little blue roadster with the top down,”
solving mysteries that crop up in her “fairy tale” world of
summer homes, country clubs, and travel to Paris.20 Nancy is
“an incurable optimist who cleverly turns obstacles to her
own advantage.”21 The mystery novels thus offer a tempting,
though ultimately unreachable, prospect:
13. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2572 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
14. Id. at 2572.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. SOTOMAYOR, supra note 1, at 79.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 79-80.
21. Id. at 80.
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I was convinced I would make an excellent detective. My mind
worked in ways very similar to Nancy Drew’s, I told myself: I was
a keen observer and listener. I picked up on clues. I figured things
out logically, and I enjoyed puzzles. I loved the clear, focused feeling
that came when I concentrated on solving a problem and everything
else faded out. And I could be brave when I needed to be. . . . I could
be a great detective, if only I weren’t diabetic. 22

Thwarted in her original plan, Sotomayor redirects her
focus to another fictional character, the defense lawyer Perry
Mason, whose weekly television program featured a trial in
which he invariably established his client’s innocence. But
she finds her interest expanding also to include the
prosecutor, because he “was more committed to finding the
truth than to winning his case.”23 And, finally, she becomes
“fascinated” by the judge, a shadowy figure who nonetheless
served as “a personification of justice,” controlling the
courtroom and resolving the case.24 She finds in the television
trials “a whole new vocabulary” that was “like the puzzles
[she] enjoyed, a complex game with its own rules, and one
that intersected with grand themes of right and wrong.”25 In
the course of her career, Sotomayor would later play variants
of all three roles: defense attorney, prosecutor, and trial court
judge. And, finally, as a Supreme Court Justice, she would
continue to puzzle out the arguments of her colleagues and
chart their intersections with those grand themes.
Although Sotomayor presents herself as a Justice who
enjoys solving puzzles, she shows little inclination to
challenge her readers by creating them. Her opinions, even
those written alone in dissent, seldom offer elevated diction
or complicated verbal structures. They tend instead to be
direct and even colloquial in their diction, in most instances
accessible to lay readers as well as legal professionals. And
in treating the “grand themes of right and wrong” she prefers
the simple statement and accessible image to the more
technical and elaborate language of some of her colleagues.
There are relatively few metaphors in the ninety-three
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id.
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majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents that she has
authored in her first five terms on the Court. And those that
do appear are generally familiar from common usage. She
complains, for example, that a federal statute will force
plaintiffs to try to enforce their rights “with one hand tied
behind their backs,”26 and a federal statutory provision
“ensur[es] that an air carrier cannot avoid liability for a
baseless report by sticking its head in the sand.”27 She tends
to favor literal and vivid images to make her point, as when
she observes that a motorist’s limited privacy interest while
in a vehicle “does not diminish [his] privacy interest in
preventing an agent of the government from piercing his
skin”28 to test his blood alcohol level.
Sotomayor also seems comfortable drawing her imagery
from baseball, a sport that she has long followed as a devoted
New York Yankees fan. Looking for a counter to the
plurality’s examples of the way in which “and” is used to join
two statutory elements, she offers the following language
from a stadium ticket: “If today’s baseball game is rained out,
your ticket shall automatically be converted to a ticket for
next Saturday’s game, and you shall retain your free souvenir
from today’s game.”29 More directly, she applies baseball
rules to emphasize a defendant’s fatal lack of the needed
qualifications to bring his suit:
He seeks to challenge the Government’s title to Indian trust land
(strike one); he seeks to force the Government to relinquish
possession and title outright (strike two); and he does not claim any
personal right, title, or interest in the property (strike three). 30

In a decision on water rights in the Red River Valley, she
playfully introduces another sport by noting that the river
“has lent its name to a valley, a Civil War campaign, and a
26. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1669 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
27. Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 862 (2014).
28. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1565 (2013).
29. Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2221 (2014) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
30. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,
132 S. Ct. 2199, 2214 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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famed college football rivalry between the Longhorns of
Texas and the Sooners of Oklahoma.”31
In contrast to the images of luxury in the bankruptcy
case, Sotomayor chooses a very different sort of image when
she dissents from the majority’s interpretation of the federal
immigration statute. As she constructs her analysis for
determining whether “aged-out children” who have reached
the age of twenty-one should retain their priority to join their
family members in the United States, she employs a vivid
image drawn from ordinary experience.32 Under the
majority’s reading of the statute, she points out, if a parent
fails to reach “the front of the visa line” before the child turns
twenty-one, that child will be placed “all the way at the back
of the F2B line.”33 Her reading of the statute differs:
Congress could have required aged-out children like Ruth Uy to lose
their place in line and wait many additional years (or even decades)
before being reunited with their parents, or it could have enabled
such immigrants to retain their place in line—albeit at the cost of
extending the wait for other immigrants by some shorter amount. 34

Instead, she argues, Congress has chosen the fairest way to
resolve the competing interests at stake: the child who has
already waited patiently in line for many years has been
favored over the child who has just joined the line and will
have to wait just a bit longer. Her reading is, she concludes,
“a commonsense approach to statutory interpretation”35 that
will result in an equitable distribution of burdens. And her
image is carefully chosen to resonate with all those who have
waited in line for far less significant benefits.
Sotomayor’s preference for examples drawn from
ordinary life appears in some surprising contexts. Writing for
the majority to reverse a defamation judgment against an
airline that had fired a pilot after his angry response to a

31. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2013).
32. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2217.
33. Id. at 2218.
34. Id. at 2228.
35. Id.
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failed simulator test, Sotomayor distinguishes the pilot’s
outburst from less dramatic situations:
But Hoeper did not just lose his temper; he lost it in circumstances
that he knew would lead to his firing, which he regarded as the
culmination of a vendetta against him. . . . In short, Hoeper was not
some traveling businessman who yelled at a barista in a fit of pique
over a badly brewed cup of coffee.36

The businessman has lost his temper in a commonplace, if
unpleasant, incident, while the pilot’s explosion raises
legitimate issues about his professional performance.
Rejecting the Court’s holding of broad whistleblower
protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Sotomayor offers
an example of what she considers an excessively broad
reading of the statute. “If, for example,” she writes, “a nanny
is discharged after expressing a concern to his employer that
the employer’s teenage son may be participating in some
Internet fraud, the nanny can bring a § 1514A suit.”37 The
domestic setting highlights her sense that “there is little
reason to think that Congress intended to sweep” such a
broad range of potential situations under the statute.38
This opinion is also noteworthy in another regard:
Sotomayor’s deliberate use of “his” when referring to the
nanny. That gesture, silently challenging the widespread
assumption that a nanny would be female rather than male,
is not an isolated instance. In several other opinions,
Sotomayor makes the same point by switching genders in the
opposite direction. Writing for the Court in her first term, she
observes that “[a]n attorney uncertain about what the
FDCPA requires must choose between, on the one hand,
exposing herself to liability and, on the other, resolving the
legal ambiguity against her client’s interest or advising the
client to settle.”39 In a concurring opinion later that same
term, she refers to the lodestar calculation of an attorney’s
fee by “examining the attorney’s reasonable hours expended
36. Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 866.
37. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1184 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Jerman v. Carlisle, 559 U.S. 573, 597 (2010).
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and her reasonable hourly rate . . . .”40 Expanding her focus,
in a Fourth Amendment case she refers to a GPS system’s
ability to “generate[ ] a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”41 And, writing for the Court, she goes a
step further, observing that “[a]n acquittal is unreviewable
whether a judge directs a jury to return a verdict of
acquittal . . . or forgoes that formality by entering a judgment
of acquittal herself.”42 These pronouns all make the same
point: the roles played by women in the legal arena as
litigants, attorneys, and judges are identical to those played
by men.
Closely linked to her preference for examples drawn from
ordinary experience is Sotomayor’s similar invocation of
common sense as a valuable, and sometimes neglected, tool
of legal analysis. Writing for the Court, she rejects the
petitioners’ claim that the Torture Victim Prosecution Act’s
use of “individual” should be read to include nonsovereign
organizations, in this case the Palestinian Authority and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization.43 Since the statute does
not define “individual,” she turns to “the word’s ordinary
meaning.”44 Elaborating on the point, she offers a
commonsensical explanation:
After all, that is how we use the word in everyday parlance. We say
“the individual went to the store,” “the individual left the room,”
and “the individual took the car,” each time referring unmistakably
to a natural person. And no one, we hazard to guess, refers in
normal parlance to an organization as an “individual.”45

Elsewhere, she dissents from the majority’s reading of the
statutory phrase “actual damages” to exclude mental
distress, insisting that her broader reading “accords with
40. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 602 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
41. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
42. Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1074 (2013).
43. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (2012).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1707.
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common sense.”46 And when, in another case, the dissent
claims that there is “‘no practical, real-world effect’” to
treating a jurisdictional rule as mandatory, she counters that
its position in fact “ignores the real world.”47 For Sotomayor,
the legal universe is not a closed system; it must be viewed
as part of that “real world” in determining how its rules apply
to actual situations.
The tone of Sotomayor’s opinions remains in harmony
with her “real world” perspective through her use of
colloquial diction. Thus, the majority’s view that a search for
“gang-related items” was justified by their possible
usefulness in impeaching the defendant “is a non-starter”;48
neither “snippet” from legislative reports cited by petitioners
undermines the Court’s holding;49 the dissent has failed to
identify its “true gripe”;50 a proposed reading of a tax
regulation “tell[s] courts to treat outliers . . . as flukes”;51 and
a federal statute doesn’t “so much as hint that it views a $5
hit to the pocketbook as more worthy of remedy than
debilitating mental distress.”52
Sotomayor also uses sentence fragments to introduce a
conversational tone that sharpens her points. In her first
dissent on the Court, she responds to the majority’s dismissal
of an issue raised by the Solicitor General with a tentative
“Perhaps so” before going on to criticize its easy dismissal of
executive expertise.53 Disregarding conventional syntax, she
may ask the reader the one word question “Why?” to ponder
why the political process must remain open to all citizens on
46. Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1463 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
47. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 651 n.7 (2012) (quoting 132 S. Ct. at 658
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
48. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1256 (2012).
49. Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1892 (2012).
50. Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1080 n.8 (2013).
51. PPL Corp. v. Comm’r., 133 S. Ct. 1897, 1910 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
52. Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1463 (2012).
53. Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 312-13 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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equal terms and then answer her own question with another
sentence fragment: “[f]or the same reason we guard the right
of every citizen to vote.”54 She may seem to accept the
majority’s criticism of a statute’s vagueness by responding
simply “Fair enough” before going on to criticize Congress’
unclear drafting.55 Or she may challenge the majority’s
position by asking simply and colloquially “Says who?” before
answering her own question with another fragment:
“Certainly not the statute.”56 Such informal structures serve
to engage the reader as well as the opposing Justices in an
exchange of views.
Although Sotomayor generally prefers to counter the
other side’s arguments with her own persuasive strategies
rather than to launch a direct attack, she will occasionally
offer a restrained rejoinder. When the majority notes that
two thirds of the jurors and alternates in Skilling’s trial
lacked any personal link to Enron, she counters mildly that
“[t]his means, of course, that five of the seated jurors and
alternates did have connections to friends or colleagues who
had lost jobs or money as a result of Enron’s collapse—a fact
that does not strike me as particularly reassuring.”57 At other
times she is more direct in her criticism. Writing for the
Court, she counters Justice Scalia’s criticism of “the
complexity of [her] approach” in another criminal case with a
two-pronged attack, first noting tartly that the dissent has
misread the majority and then adding that “we, at least, are
unwilling to sacrifice accuracy for simplicity.”58 Writing in
dissent in another case, she notes that “[u]nlike my
colleagues in the majority, I refuse to assume that Congress
simply engaged in sloppy drafting.”59 More pointedly, in a
third dissent she rejects the majority’s reliance on the fact
54. Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1669 (2014).
55. Lawson v. FMR, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1158, 1179 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
56. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2576 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
57. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 459 n.21 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (2011).
59. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1416 (2011).
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that the police officer’s disputed warrant had been approved
by two of his of superiors and a district attorney. “Under the
majority’s test,” she concludes, “four wrongs apparently
make a right.”60
Perhaps Sotomayor’s harshest critique of a majority
opinion appears in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action,61 where six Justices upheld an
amendment to the Michigan State Constitution banning
affirmative action in public education.62 She offers examples
of the ways in which “race matters,” a phrase that she repeats
no fewer than eight times in less than a single page of her
opinion. Those echoes appear most powerfully in a paragraph
offering examples drawn from minority experience:
And race matters for reasons that really are only skin deep,
that cannot be discussed any other way, and that cannot be wished
away. Race matters to a young man’s view of society when he spends
his teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no matter
the neighborhood where he grew up. Race matters to a young
woman’s sense of self when she states her hometown, and then is
pressed, “No, where are you really from?”, regardless of how many
generations her family has been in the country. Race matters to a
young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign language, which
he does not understand because only English was spoken at home.
Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the silent
judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: “I do not
belong here.”63

Rejecting the majority view that such concerns serve only to
“perpetuate[ ] racial discrimination,”64 she paraphrases Chief
Justice Roberts’ often quoted conclusion from Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District—
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race”—while turning it on its
head to support her argument.65 In Sotomayor’s version,
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
60. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1260 (2012).
61. 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
62. 134 S. Ct. at 1623-24 (2014) (Kennedy, J., plurality).
63. Id. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. 551 U.S.701, 748 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.).
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speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply
the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of
centuries of racial discrimination.”66
Just as Sotomayor uses some of her bluntest language
when discussing the value of affirmative action to young men
and women, she is at her most sympathetic when dealing
with the rights of children. The issue in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina67 was whether the Court’s analysis of Miranda
rights should be altered when the suspect is a child. J.D.B.,
a thirteen year old, was suspected of breaking and entering
and larceny. The investigating officer came to his school and
questioned J.D.B. in the presence of school officials; he
received no Miranda warnings and no opportunity to contact
his family before the questioning, which resulted in his
confession. Writing for the majority, Sotomayor found that a
suspect’s age should be a factor in considering whether a
suspect’s Miranda rights have been violated.
The starting point for Sotomayor’s analysis is the clear
difference between a child and an adult. In her view, “[a]
child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’”68 It follows
that a child’s response will differ from an adult’s in the same
situation. That “commonsense” perception, she observes
dryly, is “self-evident to anyone who was a child once himself,
including any police officer or judge.”69 This is, in other words,
an obvious proposition, one that requires no “citation to social
science and cognitive science authorities.”70 And she sees “no
reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that
commonsense reality.”71 In fact, she finds, it would be
“nonsensical” to fail to consider age in assessing a custody
situation.72

66. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1676.
67. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
68. Id. at 2403 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2403 n.5.
71. Id. at 2399.
72. Id. at 2405.
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Sotomayor thus links two related propositions: “Children
cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults,”73 and judges,
“including those whose childhoods have long since passed,”74
are perfectly capable of taking into account the age of a child
being questioned. Returning to one of her favorite themes,
the usefulness of common sense in legal analysis, she
concludes with a tidy summary: “In short, officers and judges
need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental
psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in
social and cultural anthropology. They simply need the
common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old
and neither is an adult.”75
The theme of common sense legal analysis is tied in turn
to another theme, the role of empathy in judicial
decisionmaking. Here, she insists, “the question becomes
how a reasonable person would understand the
circumstances, either from the perspective of a blind person
or, as here, a 13-year-old child.”76 Since we have all been
children, however long ago, she feels comfortable drawing on
that shared human experience to inform the way in which
legal doctrine should apply to children in the legal system.
Justice Sotomayor locates her opinions in a framework
broader than the current state of the law, a framework based
on her sense that the law should be interpreted not merely
as a technical discipline but also as a reflection of human
experience. When she weighs the impact of an immigration
statute on family unity or police interrogation on a child
suspect, she reminds her colleagues that they may, and at
times should, draw on that experience to reach their
decisions. In both of her public roles—as autobiographer and
Justice—Sotomayor asks her readers and her judicial
colleagues to keep in mind the links between life and the law.

73. Id. at 2404.
74. Id. at 2407.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2403 n.9.

